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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the cross-national and longitudinal relationships between social capital, GDP, and well-being. The 
question it tries to address is: is economic growth eroding social capital over time? I find that in countries where economic 
growth is accompanied by increasing income inequality, social capital is eroded. Additionally, we focus on the interplay of 
social capital, GDP, and well-being, explore the role of social capital as a predictor of subjective well-being over various 
time-spans, and compares this result with the role of GDP.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent empirical research in social sciences suggests that social capital, defined as “networks together with 
shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (OECD, 2001), is 
an important ingredient of economic growth and of subjective well-being, i.e. the individual evaluation of own 
well-being. 
1.1. Social capital and economic growth 
There seems to be no doubts that money and social capital are positively correlated both within and across 
countries. A large share of the economic literature agrees on ascribing an important role to social capital in 
enhancing economic growth. In simple words, this literature sees social capital as a catalyst of economic 
interactions. Many works refer to Arrow’s words describing trust as one of the elements of every commercial 
transaction and ascribing some of the backwardness in the world - at least in part - to the lack of confidence in 
other people (Arrow, 1972). Accordingly, many empirical works found evidence of a positive cross-sectional 
correlation between proxies of social capital and economic growth (La Porta et al., 1999; Whiteley, 2000; Zak 
and Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; della Giusta, 2010). For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) - one of 
the most cited works in this field - find that economic performance and social capital, as proxied by trust and 
civic cooperation, are strongly and positively associated. Similarly, Helliwell and Putnam (1995) investigating 
Italian regions find a positive association between levels of “civic community” and GDP growth rates between 
1950 and 1990 after controlling for the initial income level. Similarly, Narayan and Pritchett (1997) find evidence 
that higher levels of social capital, as proxied by group membership, are correlated with higher incomes. 
 
There are many reasons to argue that social capital supports economic growth. Social capital lowers the 
possibilities for opportunistic behaviours and makes economic transactions safer and cheaper. This - in turn - 
frees people’s energies to develop new techniques and investing in productive activities rather than protecting 
themselves from opportunistic behaviours. Hence, it is commonly held that more social capital, in the form of 
more trust, frees economic resources and enhances business. By the same token, higher social capital reduces the 
need for formal institutions to enforce agreements reducing “principal-agent” problems. Similarly, reliability of 
public officers is a good condition to attract greater investments and further economic activity (Knack and 
Keefer, 1997). Social capital, in the form of social norms, favours the provision and maintenance of public goods 
solving collective action problems thanks to social stigma and ostracism. Finally, social capital can enhance 
economic activity also through some indirect channels. For example, “civic norms help voters overcome the 
collective action problem in monitoring officials” (Knack and Keefer, 1997, p. 1254). 
1.2. Social capital and subjective well-being 
Similarly, some recent studies point to social capital as an important ingredient of people’s well-being 
(Sarracino, 2012). Various definitions of social capital have been proposed. For example, Pierre Bourdieu 
defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition ... which 
provides each of its members with the backing of collectively-owned capital.” (Bourdieu, 1986, p248). James 
Coleman states, “Social capital is the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social 
organization and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child or a young person.” (Coleman, 
1990, p. 302).  
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Putnam (2000) refers to social capital as the set of social connections, shared norms and values available in 
a society and enabling people to cooperate (even unintentionally) to reach shared goals and to develop mutual 
trust. 
 
Even though the debate on the definition of social capital is still open, there is broader consensus on how to 
proxy it. A large body of empirical studies from the “happiness economics” literature focused on the link between 
social capital and subjective well-being and found a positive relationship among them. In particular, it seems that 
the quality of the relationships among people, has a predominant impact on well-being (Helliwell and Putnam, 
2004; Helliwell, 2006; Bruni and Stanca, 2008; Becchetti et al., 2008). 
 
This result is not surprising. Campbell et al. (1976) already noted that some domains, such as family life and 
marriage, friendship and social contacts, were very important for satisfaction with life as a whole. The 
psychological foundations of this relationship stays in the fact that social relationships positively affect the main 
components of happiness: positive affect, satisfaction, and prevention of distress (Argyle and Martin, 1991). 
There are several explanations of the importance of social relationships for positive affect. A first explanation is 
in terms of the pleasantness of the things that people do together. Social relationships can cause positive affect 
because people tend to spend time together in pleasant activities, such as eating, drinking, talking, and playing 
(Argyle and Furnham, 1982). A second explanation refers to non-verbal communications and suggests that 
people sharing social connections exchange positive non-verbal signs of liking each other with positive effects on 
people’s mood (Kraut and Johnston, 1979). Another explanation moves from the observation that social 
interactions provide bonding and, therefore, positive affect. These mechanisms have been used, for example, to 
explain why babies do not enjoy watching a recording of their mothers, but they are very happy to interact with 
them remotely (Argyle, 1988). 
 
The relationship between social contacts and the second component of happiness - satisfaction - is less 
controversial. Social relationships are a source of material help, social support and shared activities, all aspects 
enhancing people’s satisfaction (Veroff et al., 1981). However, social relationships not only provide mutual 
support, but also are also powerful shelters from sickness, mental disorders, and other forms of distress. In a 
famous study, Berkman and Syme (1979) show that people with stronger social networks tend to have longer and 
healthier lives. Remarkably, this result is robust to the inclusion of several control variables accounting for initial 
health, health practices, obesity, and unhealthy behaviours. The reason why social contacts enhance individual 
health is that social support reduces the negative effects of stress on the immune system (Jemmott and Locke, 
1984). Moreover, people with stronger social networks tend to cope with stress in more constructive and less 
harmful ways than others. For example, Badura (1984) documents that people with less social relationships tend 
to cope with stress by drinking, smoking and adopting other dangerous behaviours such as risky driving, thus 
having higher chances of developing worst health. 
1.3. The unasked question 
Summarising, there seem to be several good reasons to believe that social capital is an important correlate of 
economic growth and of subjective well-being. But is this relationship stable over time? In other words, is the 
positive cross-section relation among the three variables also confirmed over time? This question has only 
partially been addressed. 
 
For example, we know that in the long run economic growth does not make people happier or more satisfied 
with their lives (Easterlin, 1974). This result, commonly known as the “Easterlin paradox,” has been strongly 
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criticized (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Sacks et al., 2010), however some more recent studies have 
corroborated its existence (Easterlin et al., 2010; Bruni and Stanca, 2008; Becchetti et al., 2011; Bartolini and 
Sarracino, 2011). This evidence suggests that in the long run economic growth will not deliver significant 
improvements in people’s well-being. In the light of the way modern societies are organized, this evidence is not 
only paradoxical, but also surprising and disappointing. At any point in time, economic growth correlates with 
higher well-being, but over time this relationship vanishes suggesting that economic growth did not keep its 
promise of improving human conditions. Moreover, we have some evidence suggesting that in the long run social 
capital is an important correlate of well-being and this relationship holds also after controlling for economic 
growth (Bartolini and Sarracino; 2011, Sarracino, 2011; Bartolini et al., 2012b,a). 
 
But what is the relationship over time between economic growth and social capital? The literature neglected 
this point even though some authors have argued that economic growth can have detrimental effects on social 
capital (see Polanyi (1968), Hirsch (1976), Olson (1982) and more recently Bartolini and Bonatti (2008)). It is 
plausible that a vibrant society - rich in associational activity and trust - could efficiently drive collective action 
towards policies detrimental for economic growth. For example, labour market reforms liable to enhance 
economic activity can be impaired by an efficient social action resting upon social capital. In a pioneering study 
on 17 developed countries, Helliwell (1996) provides evidence of a negative relationship between trust in others 
and productivity growth from 1960 to 1992. Moreover, Putnam (2000) provides convincing evidence that over 
the last 30 years US - one of the richest countries in the world - experienced an erosion of social capital while 
growing more prosperous (Costa and Kahn, 2003; Bartolini et al., 2011; Sarracino, 2011). Some recent studies 
also document that: i. social capital is not crystallized and it can vary over time even in a relatively short term 
(Sarracino, 2011); ii. economic growth can be the outcome of social erosion Bartolini and Bonatti (2002a, 2008). 
 
Hence, there are reasons to carefully reconsider the relationship between social capital and economic growth 
investigating their correlation over time. Indeed, the traditional literature suffers an important limitation: it is 
based on correlations between stocks of social capital and economic growth, while neglecting the relationship 
with the variations of social capital over time. In other words, existing research misses the time dimension of the 
problem. 
 
Only very recently Roth (2009), using data on social capital from the first three waves of the World Values 
Survey, the third European Value Study wave and the Eurobarometer 25 for 1986, documents that the changes of 
trust over time are negatively correlated with economic growth during the ’90s. However, Roth’s work is 
constrained by the availability of a relatively short time-series (1980 - 2002) and considers only one proxy of 
social capital, namely trust in others. 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide some evidence about the relationship among social capital, economic 
growth, and well-being over time. In particular, I would like to provide some evidence to check whether the 
negative relationship between economic growth and well-being over time is mediated by social capital. 
 
Therefore, I will first review the available evidence on the relationship over time between economic growth, 
well-being and social capital. Thanks to the recent developments of the World Values Survey/European Values 
Study (WVS/EVS) integrated data-set covering the period from 1980 to 2009, I will reconsider the available 
evidence on the relationship between economic growth and social capital using a larger number of proxies 
(namely trust in others, civic attitudes and group membership) and adopting a time-series perspective. 
 
124   Francesco Sarracino /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  72 ( 2013 )  120 – 148 
My analysis confirms previously observed positive correlation between the stock of social capital and GDP 
across countries: at any point in time, richer countries are also richer in social capital. However, after adopting a 
time-series perspective comparing the time trends of social capital with economic growth, a negative and 
significant relationship arises. 
 
Several hypothesis can be proposed to explain this puzzling evidence. A convincing one suggests that 
economic growth can set at various paces and with different impacts on the social fabric of a country. Therefore, 
if economic growth is accompanied by an increase in inequality, we might suspect that social linkages and 
feelings of solidarity and cooperation can get weaker resulting in an erosion of social capital. In present work, I 
provide some evidence that when economic growth goes with a rise in economic inequality - as measured by the 
Gini index – an erosion of social capital accompanies it. Section 2 will provide a theoretical explanation of the 
mechanisms linking economic growth, social capital, and well-being. Subsequently, section 3 will review the 
available evidence about the relationship over time between social capital and well-being, whereas the test of the 
relationship between economic growth and social capital will be the subject of section 4. Finally, some 
concluding remarks will be discussed in section 5. 
2. Economic growth from negative externalities 
Which are the mechanisms that might link social capital, well-being, and economic growth? This question 
motivated two researchers to investigate whether economic growth and decreasing happiness are two sides of the 
same coin: the erosion of social capital (Bartolini and Bonatti, 2002a;2003; 2008). 
 
The two authors propose a model known as “Negative Externalities Growth” (NEG) explaining economic 
growth as the outcome of a substitution process of free goods for private and expensive ones. Free goods are 
goods that are freely available to everybody, such as natural – air, water, sun, etc. – and social – trust, honesty, 
generosity, prosocial behaviours – resources. Free goods are identified as goods that are renewable or 
unrestrictedly available to everybody. Many studies from social psychology, sociology, and economics proved 
that people benefit from the consumption of free goods. In particular, there seems to be no doubts that people 
sharing good relationships with others tend to be happier (Helliwell and Putnam, 2004; Helliwell, 2007) (please, 
refer also to section 1.2). 
 
The NEG model explains economic growth as the outcome of the following mechanism: in societies where 
free goods become scarcer, people can buy substitute goods that are provided by the market. The only difference 
is that this time goods are no more free, but they are private and expensive. For example, if cities become 
polluted, dangerous, and unfriendly it is possible to compensate the lower quality of the living environment by 
buying a second house at the seaside. Similarly, it is possible to compensate the lower chances of social 
interaction adopting various forms of home entertainment to make the time spent at home more pleasant. We can 
imagine various such examples where the common element is that people face a new layer of expenditures to 
shelter from the impoverishment of the social and natural environment. This new layer of expenditures is usually 
called defensive expenditures. 
 
From the viewpoint of the market, this implies that social relationships, normally freely available in a safer 
and more enjoyable environment, are substituted by private goods provided by the market. The consumption of 
free goods is not recorded in the national accounts, whereas the consumption of private and expensive goods 
contributes to GDP and thus also to economic growth. Moreover, to stand a higher private consumption people 
need to increase their working effort further feeding economic growth. 
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Therefore, the erosion of free goods, such as social capital, increases the demand for private substitute goods 
resulting in economic growth. The side effects of this mechanism are two-fold: on one side increasing private 
expenditure and working effort results in less time available for other activities affecting the opportunities to 
cultivate social relationships. For example, the time available for friends and interpersonal relations decreases, 
thus lowering social capital and, more in general, free goods. On the other side, the widening set of what is 
tradeable extends the sphere of influence of marketable goods and services over a larger set of domains of 
people’s lives. 
 
Summarizing, economic growth can be the outcome of negative externalities in the consumption of free 
goods: people are pushed to consume private goods to compensate for the decrease in well-being due to the 
erosion of the quality of the living environment. This in turn feeds economic growth generating further negative 
externalities and erosion of free goods. In other words, according to the NEG model economic growth is the 
outcome of a self-augmentative process in which media and advertisement are powerful tools to push the 
substitution process. This model predicts that the higher is the rate of economic growth, the worst is the trend of 
well-being, and the stronger is the erosion of free goods and particularly of social capital. 
3. Social capital, economic growth and well-being over time 
How are the trends of subjective well-being and social capital related over time? Bartolini and Sarracino 
(2011) compare the trends of social capital- as proxied by the participation of people in groups and associations - 
with the trends of subjective well-being using data from the integrated WVS/EVS data-set. Trends are computed 
for all the countries with at least 15 years and three waves of observations. Results are reported in Figure 1 and 
Table 1. These figures inform that in the long run the trend of group membership is significantly and positively 
correlated with subjective well-being (see fig. 1). This is a very robust result since it holds even after controlling 
for the trend of GDP per capita (see tab. 1).  
 
In the long run, the trends of both happiness and life satisfaction are significantly and positively correlated to 
the trends of group membership, but not with the trends of GDP per capita.  
 
Is it possible that this result is driven by more developed countries, for which basic needs have been met and 
people are finally free to care for something else - such as social relation- ships? Evidence from poorer countries 
is scarce; nonetheless, two recent works shed light on the situation of transition economies. Easterlin (2009) and 
Bartolini et al. (2012b) show that even if economic growth does matter for people’s well-being over time, also in 
this case social relationships are important for people’s well-being (see Table 3). 
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Figure 1. Correlation among long-term trends of subjective well-being and social capitalb. 
Source: Bartolini and Sarracino (2011), WVS-EVS integrated data set. 
 
 
Table 1. Long-term trends of proxies of subjective well-being over trends of social capital and GDP standardized variables, t statistics in 
parentheses.  
 
 happiness life satisfaction 
group membership 0.608*** 0.330** 
 (2.19) (3.58) 
log GDP −0.0100 0.0447 
 (−0.07) (0.35) 
Constant −0.690*** −0.634*** 
 (−3.88) (−6.87) 
Observations 27 27 
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.087 
Source: Bartolini and Sarracino (2011), WVS-EVS integrated data set.  
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
b trends are computed regressing the proxies of subjective well-being and the share of people members of at least one group or association 
over a time variable including all the years when the dependent variable is observed. The β coefficients thus represent the average yearly 
variation of the dependent variable as measured over a period of at least 15 years. Trends are computed separately for each country and then 
standardized to improve comparability among variables.  
127 Francesco Sarracino /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  72 ( 2013 )  120 – 148 
Table 2. Trends of subjective well-being over changes of the index of social trust and trends of GDP, t statistics in parenthesesc.  
 
 happiness life satisfaction 
index of social trust 0.797*** 0.731*** 
 (4.03) (8.06) 
log GDP 0.268** 0.323* 
 (2.41) (2.02) 
Constant −7.96e − 10 − 5.56e − 10 
 (−0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 24 24 
Adjusted R2 0.702 0.630 
Source: Bartolini and Sarracino (2011), ESS data set.  
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001 
 
 
Even though the sample size is small, results are robust to the presence of influential points and suggest that 
economic growth and the index of social trust are comparably correlated with the trends of well-being: over a 
period of at least 6 years, the changes in social capital are as important as economic growth for people’s well-
being in transition countries. 
 
But this is not all the available evidence. Some other studies tried to answer the same question adopting a 
within country perspective and eventually panel data. Using micro data from the US General Social Survey 
covering the last 30 years, Bartolini et al. (2011) show that four forces acting in contrasting directions explain a 
large portion of the declining American happiness trend. The first one is the increase in per capita income, which 
positively affects subjective well-being, while the remaining three negatively affect happiness. The declining 
American well-being seems shaped by three forces: 1) the increase in income of other fellow Americans, which 
erodes approximately 2/3 of the positive impact brought about by the increase in family income; 2) a further 
reduction in American subjective well-being is explained by the decrease in the confidence in institutions, a 
further component of social capital and 3) finally, the erosion of relational goods has a further negative effect on 
well-being. Its magnitude is comparable to the one exerted by social comparisons. 
 
The combined effect of these four forces on American subjective well-being is negative and is almost entirely 
explained by the negative impact (on well-being) of social comparisons, lower confidence in institutions, and the 
erosion of sociability. These three forces together more than offset the positive impact of increasing income. 
From an econometric viewpoint, these results explain almost all the variation in American happiness and suggest 
a striking role of relational goods in determining happiness. 
  
 
c The index of social trust is the weighted average of the answers to questions about whether most people can be trusted or not, whether 
other people try to take advantage of others and whether people try to be helpful or rather looking for themselves. Each of these three items 
ranges on a 0 to 10 scale, where the lowest category corresponds to the worst judgement and the highest to the best one. Weights are obtained 
from a factor analysis. All the trends are standardized. The sample includes transition economies. 
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Table 3. Trends of subjective well-being over changes of the index of social trust and trends of GDP in transition countries, t statistics in 
parenthesesd.  
 
 happiness life satisfaction 
index of social trust 0.696** 0.727** 
 (3.64) (5.24) 
log GDP 0.678** 0.683** 
 (3.08) (7.98) 
Constant −6.83e − 09 1.22e − 08 
 (−0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 7 7 
Adjusted R2 0.763 0.830 
Source: Bartolini et al. (2012b), ESS data set. 
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001 
 
 
Simulations reveal that, if social capital had stayed at 1975 levels, American subjective well-being would have 
increased today. This evidence has been confirmed more recently also for another country: Germany. Using the 
German Socio Economic Panel and a wider set of variables, Bartolini et al. (2010) confirm previous results 
showing that the variation in the German subjective well-being between 1994 and 2007 is explained by the same 
forces shaping the American well-being. The only difference, in this case, is that, during the last fifteen years, 
German social capital has been increasing with an overall positive effect on subjective well-being. Still, this 
study suggests that if social capital had not increased, the net result for subjective well-being would have been the 
same as the American one.  
 
Overall, there seems to be convincing evidence that over time what really matters for people’s well-being are 
social relationships rather than money. Shall we conclude that GDP has no role for people’s well-being? 
Available evidence suggests that economic growth has a clear and strong effect on people’s well-being, but only 
in the short run. When the changes over time are computed over intervals of 2 years, GDP turns out to be almost 
2 times more strongly correlated to well-being than the index of social trust. In the case of life satisfaction, the 
coefficient of the proxy of social capital is also not significantly different from zero (Bartolini and Sarracino, 
2011). The same result holds for transition economies (Bartolini et al., 2012b). This evidence confirms that 
economic growth is an important correlate of the trends of subjective well-being across countries, but it debunks 
the belief that money is all that matters for well-being. Even in countries regarded as an extreme case of 
relevance of material concerns for well-being, social trust is confirmed to be a relevant predictor of the variation 
over time of well-being. 
  
 
d Data are retrieved from the European Social Survey. The index of social trust is the weighted average of the answers to questions about 
whether most people can be trusted or not, whether other people try to take advantage of others and whether people try to be helpful or rather 
looking for themselves. Each of these three items ranges on a 0 to 10 scale, where the lowest category corresponds to the worst judgement 
and the highest to the best one. Weights are obtained from a factor analysis. All the trends are standardized. 
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Table 4. Changes of subjective well-being over changes of the index of social trust and of GDP, t statistics in parenthesese.  
 
 happiness life satisfaction 
index of social trust 0.255** 0.214** 
 (2.18) (1.58) 
log GDP 0.568** 0.525** 
 (4.69) (4.73) 
Constant −3.27e − 09 1.76e − 09 
 (−0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 58 58 
Adjusted R2 0.393 0.318 
Source: Bartolini et al. (2012b), ESS data set. 
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001 
4. Economic growth and social capital: happily together ever after? 
The evidence from the previous section provides a picture that is compatible with the prediction of the NEG 
model. In the long run, economic growth does not raise well-being, whereas social capital does. This suggests 
the existence of a trade-off between economic growth and social capital over time that, as anticipated in the 
Introduction, has been quite neglected in the literature. Present section intends to explore this issue in more detail 
using a broader set of proxies of social capital, namely trust in others, civic cooperation and group membership, 
and adopting about 30 years of observations. 
4.1. Data 
The focus of this section is on the correlation between the variations of social capital and GDP growth over 
time. Therefore, the availability of comparable time-series across countries is the main limiting aspect of present 
analysis. I adopt the 6 waves integrated World Values Survey (WVS) - European Values Study (EVS) data-set 
which is currently the most comprehensive database providing cross-nationally comparable data concerning 
many domains of social life over a long time span6. The surveys have been conducted on nationally 
representative samples of 800 to 4,000 people per wave in more than 80 countries, summing up to a total of more 
than 400,000 observations from the early ’80s to the year 2009. Data have been collected in 1981 - 1984, 1989 - 
1993, 1994 - 1998, 1999 - 2004, 2005 – 2007, and 2008 - 2009. 
 
In the current analysis, I include only those countries with repeated observations for each proxy of social 
capital over a period of at least 10 years in at least three waves. The latter requirement is intended to prevent that 
countries that have been surveyed more often could affect the estimates. I consider a time span of 10 years  
  
 
e The index of social trust is the weighted average of the answers to questions about whether most people can be trusted or not, whether 
other people try to take advantage of others and whether people try to be helpful or rather looking for themselves. Each of these three items 
ranges on a 0 to 10 scale, where the lowest category corresponds to the worst judgement and the highest to the best one. Weights are obtained 
from a factor analysis. All the variations are computed on intervals of 2 years and subsequently standardized. 
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Table 5. Availability of data across waves  
 
1981-1984 1989-1983 1994-1999 1999-2004 2005-2007 2008-2009 Total 
Argentina 912 961 1053 1248 983 0 5157 
Australia 1189 0 2025 0 1386 0 4600 
Austria 0 1301 0 1415 0 1452 4168 
Belgium 1001 2576 0 1824 0 1495 6896 
Brazil 0 1766 1141 0 1477 0 4384 
Canada 1217 1673 0 1910 2107 0 6907 
Chile 0 1458 977 1169 984 0 4588 
China 0 985 1445 963 1867 0 5260 
Denmark 1059 992 0 986 0 1478 4515 
Finland 983 558 969 1015 1000 1073 5598 
France 1117 939 0 1560 996 1487 6099 
Germany 0 2893 1951 1937 1896 1940 10617 
Iceland 909 672 0 925 0 780 3286 
India 0 0 1769 1898 1778 0 5445 
Ireland 1170 988 0 992 0 635 3785 
Italy 1302 1932 0 1946 951 1456 7587 
Japan 1099 911 985 1254 1020 0 5269 
South Korea 918 1229 1247 1200 1181 0 5775 
Malta 438 374 0 988 0 1425 3225 
Mexico 1772 1384 2231 1497 1547 0 8431 
Netherlands 1072 965 0 997 996 1523 5553 
Nigeria 0 0 1851 0 0 0 1851 
Norway 958 1156 1118 0 1018 1072 5322 
Peru 0 0 1176 1490 1480 0 4146 
Portugal 0 1149 0 975 0 1505 3629 
South Africa 1433 0 2845 2956 2967 0 10201 
Spain 2157 3887 1167 2295 1183 1468 12157 
Sweden 876 944 957 974 963 1068 5782 
Switzerland 0 863 1129 0 1186 1216 4394 
Turkey 0 0 1878 1199 1339 1651 6067 
Great Britain 1127 1440 0 960 1022 1516 6065 
United States 2259 1782 1510 1188 1239 0 7978 
Total 24968 35778 29424 37761 32566 24240 184737 
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because building and maintaining social capital can take considerable time and effort (OECD, 2001). Moreover, 
it can take some time before social capital can interact - directly or indirectly - with economic growth. 
 
Furthermore, according to the previous literature (Roth, 2009), I exclude transition economies. This choice is 
motivated by the fact that during the first years of the transition to capitalism the social, economic, and 
institutional shock could have affected social capital in unpredictable ways well beyond its relationship with 
GDP. At the same time, excluding only the observations collected close to the shock of 1989 would result in no 
transition country satisfying the 10 years time-span requirement. However, in section 4.3 I also provide some 
evidence to further justify the exclusion of transition economies. After replicating previous evidence on the cross-
section relationship between social capital and GDP across developed and developing countries and transition 
economies (see page 21), figures support the choice of excluding the latter group of countries from the sample 
used for the time series analysis. 
 
 Overall, present sample includes 32 countries with 184,737 observations (see table 5 for an overview of 
the considered countries, the sample sizes, and the availability of data). 
The limitations imposed by the length of the time-span will be removed as a sensitivity check in section 4.3. 
First, I will consider only those countries with longer time series (at least 15 years and 3 waves of observations). 
In this case, the sample is restricted to 30 countries. Subsequently, I will turn to all those countries for which at 
least two years of observations are available. In other words, I will not impose any constraint on the length of the 
time span between two observations for the same country. In this case, the sample includes approximately 50 
countries. 
 
The empirical literature on social capital found some consensus on the fact that three main features 
characterize social capital: networks, norms, and trust (Paxton, 1999; Costa and Kahn, 2003; Van Schaik, 2002). 
In present work, I observe the level of trust in a society through answers to the following question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 
The resulting dichotomous variable is set to one if the respondent answers positively; zero otherwise (Knack and 
Keefer, 1997). 
 
Civic cooperation is observed through answers to questions concerning the justifiability of each of the 
following behaviours: 
 
• “claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to”; 
• “avoiding a fare on public transport”; 
•  “cheating on taxes if you have the chance”; 
•  “accepting a bribe” 
 
Answers to these questions range on a one (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable) scales. For the purposes 
of present work, each of these variables has been recoded so that larger values stand for stronger civic 
cooperation. To construct a single variable I run a factor analysis on the four questions to generate an index of 
civic cooperation as the weighted average of the four standardized initial variables (for more details, please refer 
to the Appendix E on page 37). 
 
Finally, I proxy individual social capital by observing the respondent’s participation in various kinds of groups 
and associations. WVS/EVS include a battery of questions concerning whether people belong or actively 
participate in groups or associations. The list of organizations prompted during the interview is quite long and  
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics and missing values for the pooled data set of countries with at least 10 years long time-spans.  
 
variable Mean sd Min Max Obs Missing 
group membership 0.601 0.490 0 1 195434 0.0719 
trust 0.343 0.475 0 1 201286 0.0441 
civic cooperation 0.0612 0.944 -4.900 0.768 180140 0.145 
ln of GDP per capita 9.179 1.226 5.763 10.65 208462 0.0100 
Gini index 35.15 10.80 20.13 65.47 183846 0.127 
Source: Bartolini et al. (2012b), ESS data set. 
 
contains - among others - religious, cultural, sport, professional, environmental, human rights and political 
associations (for the complete list of groups or associations see the Appendix D on page 36). Group membership 
is measured with a dichotomous variable set to one if the respondent participates or performs unpaid voluntary 
work for at least one of the mentioned groups or associations, 0 otherwise. 
 
Data about GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) are extracted from the World Development Indicators (WDI)f 
and converted into logarithmic scale (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000). Finally, I include the Gini index 
of net income inequality. Data are taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID)g a 
longitudinal cross-national database providing comparable Gini indices of gross and net income inequality for 
171 countries (Solt, 2009). 
 
Percentages of missingness are on average below 10% and according to the literature on missing data, they do 
not raise risks of seriously biasing the estimates (Schafer, 1997, Allison, 2001, Little and Rubin, 2002). However, 
in two cases the percentage of missing data is higher: this is the case of the index of civic cooperation (14.5%) 
and for income inequality (12.7%). A comparison with table 7 - reporting the percentage of missingness wave by 
wave - informs that the two variables were not consistently observed over time. The variables composing the 
index of civic cooperation were largely not collected in the fourth wave (32.0%) and - to a smaller extent - in the 
previous three waves. Similarly, the Gini index is largely unavailable in the fifth (28.5%) and sixth (41.5%) 
wave. However, the source of missingness is the survey design: in some years and countries, the surveys did not 
include some of the questions relevant for present work. Hence, data missingness constrains the period over 
which trends can be estimated, but it does not bias the estimates of trends since we can assume the missingness 
pattern to be random (Schafer and Graham, 2002; Saunders et al., 2006). Indeed, I use individual level data to 
compute national level estimates of the variation of each variable over time. What matters in this framework is 
that missing data do not bias such estimates. Section 4.2 describes in detail the empirical strategy that I followed. 
4.2. Empirical strategy 
The analysis consists of four steps: i) I replicate previous cross-sectional evidence on the relationship between 
stocks of social capital and economic growth. I use the set of proxies and the average levels from the period 1980 
- 2009. This step intends to confirm the available evidence from the literature and provides support to exclude the 
 
f World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2. 
g http://www.siuc.edu/~fsolt/swiid/swiid.html 
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group of transition economies from the rest of the analysis; ii) I compute the trends for each of the proxies of 
social capital, GDP and Gini; iii) I regress the time trends of social capital on the time trends of the logarithm of 
GDP per-capita to assess the correlation between the two variables; iv) to explain the negative correlation 
between the trends of social capital and economic growth, I replicate my regressions on a subsample of countries 
that experienced rising economic inequality. 
 
Table 7. Percentage of data missingness across waves for the pooled data set of countries with at least 10 years long time-spans.  
 
variable Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Total 
group membership 0 0.157 0.0360 0.119 0.00196 0.0467 195434 
trust 0.0613 0.0688 0.0383 0.0291 0.0322 0.0316 201286 
civic cooperation 0.0576 0.0970 0.174 0.320 0.104 0.0326 180140 
ln of GDP per 
capita 
0.0116 0.00659 0 0.0220 0 0.0187 208462 
Gini index 0.0634 0.0303 0 0.0654 0.285 0.415 183846 
Source: Bartolini et al. (2012b), ESS data set. 
4.2.1. Estimating trends 
I compute the time trends of social capital by regressing the individual level information of each proxy over a 
time variable containing the years when the variable was observed. This computation is repeated for each country 
separately. The coefficient of the time variable represents the average yearly change of the specific proxy for a 
given country. In other words, I adopted individual level information to get aggregate average estimates of the 
variations over time for each variable. I applied a similar procedure to compute the variations of the two macro 
variables. The difference is that in this case I do not have individual level data, but national aggregate statistics 
observed in various moments in time. 
 
The regression method I used varies according to the nature of the dependent variable: in case of a 
dichotomous variable (such as participation in groups or organizations and trust in others), I adopted a probit 
model with robust standard errors reporting marginal effects. The resulting equation is: 
             (1) 
where φ is a normal cumulative distribution function. Marginal effects of coefficients are subsequently 
computed. 
In case of the logarithm of GDP, the index of civicness and economic inequality, I adopted a standard OLS 
model: 
         (2) 
in both equation 1 and 2 index j stands for the various proxies of social capital, while index i stands for 
individuals. Estimations are performed for each country separately applying the original weights provided in 
WVS/EVS. This approach allows to compute the variations for each variable accounting for what happened 
between the initial and the final year of the time series. Indeed, when dealing with long-term relationships 
traditional techniques, based on the comparison of values at the initial and final year of observations, face higher 
risks that estimates are affected by wave-specific biases due to shocks and/or measurement errors. The important 
advantage of the technique used in present analysis is that it reduces this risk by considering intermediate 
observations. 
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4.2.2. Bivariate analysis 
To check the correlation among the variations of social capital and GDP over time I run a bivariate linear 
regression with robust standard errors using the coefficients from equation 1 and 2. In this case, the unit of 
analysis shifts from the individual to the aggregated, country level. Therefore, I am moving from a micro to a 
macro perspective. The model may be formalized as: 
          (3) 
where SC and lnGDP represent the standardized time trends of social capital and of the logarithm of GDP as 
previously computed; µ is the error term and the index c refers to countries. 
I am aware that the relationships I am estimating might be affected by endogeneity problems at various levels. 
However, the present work aims at exploring the nature of the relationship between some proxies of social capital 
and economic growth. Assessing the causal nexus between these two groups of variables is beyond the goal of 
this work. Therefore, I emphasize that regressions from equation 3 explore only the correlations between 
variables. Any conclusion in terms of causal relationship is not justified. 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Cross-sectional relationship between GDP and social capital 
Is a higher stock of social capital positively associated with GDP? 
Figures from the pooled WVS/EVS data set are consistent with results from previous studies: at any point in 
time, a higher GDP is correlated with greater social capital. In figures 2, 3 and 4 information from 54 developed, 
developing and transition economies are gathered together to replicate evidence from previous studies.  
 
The relationships among variables are showed using regression lines: the solid line summarizes the linear 
correlation of the whole sample, the three dotted lines show the same information for developed, developing, and 
transition countries separately and, finally, the dashed curved line reports the quadratic fit. Linear coefficients are 
all positive and significant at least at 10%. On average, one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of GDP 
per capita is correlated with an increase by 0.32, 0.54 and 0.35 points for group membership, trust in others and 
civic cooperation, respectively (see table 16 on page 35 in the Appendix). This result is confirmed even if we 
consider the relationship among variables for each wave separatelyh. However, the availability of a larger number 
of countries with respect to previous works reveals an even more interesting pattern than the one previously 
identified. In particular, in the case of group membership and trust in others, the scatterplot reveals stratification 
among countries. Developing countries are situated on the left side of the diagram and the partial correlation 
informs that in this case richer countries report lower endowments of social capital; on the right side of the 
diagram, we find more developed countries where higher GDP is accompanied by larger stocks of social capital. 
Finally, somewhat in between among these two groups and at the bottom of the diagrams, there is the group of 
transition economies. In this case, and consistently with previous findings in the literature (Barro, 1991, Knack 
and Keefer,1997, Zak and Knack, 2001, Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005, Roth, 2009), we observe a flat 
relationship between GDP and social capital. This evidence, together with previous findings, provides support for 
the hypothesis that the economic transformation affected social capital in unpredictable ways well beyond its 
relationship with GDP. 
 
h Figures are available from the author upon request. 
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Figure 2. Correlations from the pooled data between levels of membership in groups and associations and economic growth. The light, 
medium and dark grey dashed lines summarize the correlations between the two variables in developing, transition and developed countries; 
the solid black line and the dashed black curve represent respectively the linear and curvilinear relationship on the whole sample. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Correlations from the pooled data between levels of trust in others and economic growth. The light, medium and dark grey dashed 
lines summarize the correlations between the two variables in developing, transition and developed countries; the solid black line and the 
dashed black curve represent respectively the linear and curvilinear relationship on the whole sample  
136   Francesco Sarracino /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  72 ( 2013 )  120 – 148 
 
 
Figure 4. Correlations from the pooled data between levels of the index of civic cooperation and economic growth. The light, medium and 
dark grey dashed lines summarize the correlations between the two variables in developing, transition and developed countries; the solid 
black line and the dashed black curve represent respectively the linear and curvilinear relationship on the whole sample. 
 
All in all, this stratification suggests that the data cloud is better approximated by a curvilinear U-shaped 
relationship. In other words, the availability of more data informs that for low levels of GDP, the stocks of social 
capital tend to reduce when GDP increases. Beyond a threshold of about 3250 US$ per capita, the relationship 
turns positive: among richer countries, a higher GDP is associated with higher levels of social capital. However, 
this relationship does not seem to be valid in the case of the index of civic cooperation, where a linear 
relationship seems to better fit the data. 
 
The picture presented so far is encouraging. It confirms previous results and provides an optimistic 
perspective: beyond a given threshold, a higher GDP goes with a higher social capital. Therefore, we could 
expect that, if we exclude transition economies, raising GDP is associated with increasing social capital. 
Unfortunately, the analysis of the correlation between economic growth and the variations of social capital over 
time proves this expectation wrong. 
4.3.2. Relationship between GDP and social capital over time 
Is economic growth associated with an increase of social capital? The answer is negative. If we consider the 
relationship among long term trends (computed over a period of at least 10 years and 3 waves of observations), 
an increase in GDP does not go with an increase in social capital (see figures 5, 6 and 7). A one standard 
deviation increase in the logarithm of GDP per capita is associated with a decrease by -0.23, -0.32 and -0.34 
standard deviations of groups membership, trust in others and civic cooperation respectively10 (regression results 
are presented in table 8)i. 
 
 
i The number of observations for group membership is 31 because it is not possible to compute the trend for Nigeria. Indeed, membership 
in groups and associations was observed only once in 1995. 
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Figure 5: Correlations between time trends of group membership and of the logarithm of GDP per capita. Each dot on the scatterplot 
associates the trend of group membership - on the y-axis - with the trend of the logarithm of GDP. The regression line simply depicts the 
correlation between the two variables.  
 
 
Figure 6: Correlations between time trends of trust in others and of the logarithm of GDP per capita. Each dot on the scatterplot associates the 
trend of trust in others - on the y-axis - with the trend of the logarithm of GDP. The regression line simply depicts the correlation between the 
two variables.  
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Figure 7. Correlations between time trends of norms of civic cooperation and of the logarithm of GDP per capita. Each dot on the scatterplot 
associates the trend of the index of civicness - on the y axis - with the trend of the logarithm of GDP. The regression line simply depicts the 
correlation between the two variables. 
 
These figures strongly contradict the common wisdom that social capital and GDP are associated and informs 
that for periods longer than 10 years economic growth is accompanied by the erosion of the social fabric. A story 
that is highly consistent with the evidence provided by Putnam (2000) and, more recently, by Bartolini et al. 
(2011), Roth (2009) and Sarracino (2011). 
 
Table 8. Correlations among long-term trends of social capital proxies and log of GDP per capita (standardized variables). 
 
 group membership trust in others civic cooperation 
log of GDP  -0.247**  -0.255**  -0.295**  
 (-2.12)  (-2.15)  (-2.48)  
Constant  0.719**  -0.0285  -0.410*  
 (3.44)  (-0.11)  (-1.74)  
Observations  31  32  32  
t statistics in parentheses Country fixed effects are included in the model, but omitted for brevity. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001 
 
Does the choice of the time-span matter? In other words, what does happen if we consider time-series of 
different length? To start with, let us consider the variations of GDP and social capital without imposing any 
constraint on the minimum number of years. That is to say, I am focusing on all those countries that have been 
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observed at least two times independently from the distance between the two observations. Once I exclude 
transition economies, I am left with 43 countries for group membershipj, 50 countries for trust in others and 49 
for the index of civic cooperationk (see table 9). The differences in the sample sizes are because the various 
proxies of social capital have not always been observed in the same waves. 
 
Results are consistent with the evidence from long-term trends. Figures from tab. 9 document that in two cases 
out of three, the relationship between economic growth and social capital is negative and significant. In the third 
case, trust in others, the coefficient is still negative, but not significantly different from zero. 
 
Alternatively, we could argue that a time span of at least 10 years is still too short to allow the two variables to 
adjust. For example, variations of social capital might require a very long time to adjust to economic changes. 
What does happen to the relationship between economic growth and social capital if we adopt a very long time 
perspective? 
 
Table 9. Correlations among long-term trends of SC proxies and log of GDP per capita for periods of at least two years (standardized 
variables). 
 
 group membership trust in others civic cooperation 
log of GDP  -0.271**  -0.158  -0.294*  
 (-2.19)  (-0.62)  (-1.90)  
Constant  0.280  -0.220  -0.235  
 (0.79)  (-0.91)  (-0.77)  
Observations  43  50  49  
t statistics in parentheses  
Country fixed effects are included in the model, but omitted for brevity. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001  
 
To answer this question, I focus on all those countries with time series of at least 15 years and 3 waves of 
observations. Data from 30 developed and developing countries confirm that over time economic growth goes 
with an erosion of social capital (see Table 10). 
 
Coefficients are all quite large and significant at least at 10%: an increase by one standard deviation in the 
logarithm of GDP is associated with a decline by -0.24 standard deviation points for group membership, -0.24 for 
trust in others and -0.34 for the index of civic cooperation. 
  
 
j This variable was observed only once for Indonesia (2006), Iran (2007), Jordan (2007), Nigeria (1995) and Egypt (2008), whereas it is 
completely missing for Iraq and Pakistan. In these cases it was not possible to compute trends 
k Relevant variables for Iraq were observed only once in 2004. 
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Table 10. Correlations among long term trends of SC proxies and log of GDP per capita for time span longer than 15 years (standardized 
variables). 
 
 group membership trust in others civic cooperation 
log of GDP  -0.273*  -0.244*  -0.326**  
 (-1.94)  (-1.96)  (-2.34)  
Constant  0.664**  -0.0123  -0.150  
 (2.44)  (-0.04)  (-0.53)  
Observations  30  30  30  
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001 
Country fixed effects are included in the model, but omitted for brevity. 
 
This result is consistent with the one provided by Roth (2009): considering various timespans and a larger set 
of proxies of social capital figures document the existence of a negative relationship between the variations of 
GDP and of social capital. 
 
Unfortunately, this evidence tells an uncomfortable story: economic growth, as we experienced it, goes with 
an erosion of social capital. Obviously, this point raises fundamental theoretical questions and challenges for 
policymaking. 
 
How can we explain this evidence? Is there really a trade-off between these two variables? Is the erosion of 
social capital the price that we have to pay for economic prosperity? I try to answer these questions in the 
following section. 
4.4. A possible interpretation 
This puzzling evidence does not find any immediate explanation. Why do richer countries report higher 
endowments of social capital, while over time the growth process is accompanied by social capital erosion? 
According to the NEG model, it looks like the process of economic growth was associated with some side effects 
inducing the erosion of social capital. 
 
One of the possible mechanisms to explain this evidence can be economic inequality. Indeed, economic 
development can be - at least in its early phases - associated with a rise in economic inequality. In this case, the 
negative relationship over time between social capital and GDP could be explained by an increase in economic 
inequality over time (Costa and Kahn, 2003). If a society is largely unequal, we might suspect that the linkages 
among people are weaker. Feelings of solidarity and cooperation can be eroded because of more rivalry and 
competition. Therefore, we might expect that when economic growth is accompanied by an increase in 
inequality, we are paying a price in terms of erosion of social capital. 
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Figure 8. List of countries by time trends of their Gini index. Countries marked with a circle are those characterized by larger variations than 
the average, while those marked with a triangle are characterized by smaller variations. A vertical dashed line centred on the mean helps a 
better visualization of the two groups of countries. 
 
To test the “economic inequality” hypothesis, I run a restricted version of the baseline model of equation 3 in 
which I focus on all those countries where the average index of inequality increases more than the average. 
Figure 8 compares the average increase of inequality across the countries included in present sample. Overall, 
there are 13 developed and developing countries reporting a level of inequality higher than the average one. 
Table 11 reports the results of the correlations between the time trends of social capital proxies and economic 
growth for the group of countries where inequality has been growing more than the average. 
 
Table 11 Correlations among long-term trends of SC proxies and log of GDP per capita in countries with rising inequality. 
 
 group membership trust in others civic cooperation 
log of GDP  -0.271*** -0.142** -0.285*** 
 (-6.10)  (-2.87)  (-5.71)  
Constant  0.315** -0.141  -0.104  
 (2.54)  (-0.94)  (-0.72)  
Observations  12  12  12  
Adjusted   0.286  0.002  0.231  
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001 
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In all three cases the correlations are negative and significant at 10% and coefficients are large (see table 11). 
One standard deviation increase in the trend of log of GDP per capita is associated with a decrease by 0.27, 0.14 
and 0.28 standard deviations in the trend of group membership, trust in others and the index of civic cooperation, 
respectively. Overall, these figures provide some evidence supporting the hypothesis that the negative 
relationship between economic growth and the trends of social capital is mediated by raising income inequalities. 
Indeed, if we run the same regressions on the sample of countries with more moderate in- creases of inequality, 
results turn non-significant and eventually positive 13. 
5. Summary and concluding observations 
There are several good reasons, both theoretical and empirical, supporting the existence of a positive 
relationship between economic growth, social capital and well-being. However, we have limited knowledge 
about how these variables correlate with each other over time. 
 
For example, it is acknowledged that, both within and across countries, economic growth does not increase 
subjective well-being in the long run. On the contrary, using exactly the same regression techniques, the same 
time-span and the same sample of countries, it has been shown that the trends of social capital are positively 
correlated with the trends of well-being. 
 
Is there any relationship that can explain these mechanisms? The Negative Externalities Growth (NEG) model 
provides an interpretative framework allowing putting all these elements in relationship with each other. This 
model explains economic growth as the outcome of a process of substitution of free resources – such as social 
capital – for private and expensive ones. When the social environment becomes poorer, people try to defend 
themselves by increasing their material consumption and it comes without saying that people have to work more 
to support the new layer of expenditures. A higher working effort and the new layers of expenditures are recorded 
by the national accounts thus resulting in economic growth. However, what is not recorded in the national 
account is the erosion of social capital, which, in turn, is important for people’s well-being. In other words, the 
NEG model predicts that the higher is the rate of economic growth, the stronger is the erosion of social capital 
and the worst is the trend of well-being. Empirically, this mirrors accurately what has been happening to the US 
society from the Second World War onwards. 
 
The present paper reviewed the evidence on the relationship over time among these three variables finding that 
what really matters for people’s well-being are more social relationships than money. This result is confirmed by 
both within and cross-country studies using various proxies of social capital, various time-span and various set of 
countries. Thus, shall we conclude that GDP has no role for people’s well-being? Available evidence suggests 
that economic growth has a clear and strong effect on people’s well-being, but only in the short run. When the 
changes over time are computed over intervals of 2 years, GDP turns out to be almost 2 times more strongly 
correlated to well-being than social capital (Bartolini and Sarracino, 2011). The same results holds for transition 
economies with the only difference being that in this case the coefficients of social capital are never significantly 
different from zero (Bartolini et al., 2012b). This evidence confirms that economic growth is an important 
correlate of the trends of subjective wellbeing across countries, but it debunks the beliefs that money is all that 
matters for well-being. Even in countries regarded as an extreme case of relevance of material concerns for well-
being, social capital is confirmed to be a relevant predictor of the variation over time of well-being. 
 
Moreover, this chapter tried to provide some evidence to check whether the relationship among these variables 
is due to a negative impact of economic growth on social capital. Results confirm and enrich previous evidence 
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about a positive association between stocks of social capital and economic growth. Across a sample of 54 
developed, developing and transition countries, a higher level of social capital goes with a higher GDP. In the 
case of participation in groups and associations and trust in others, a U-shaped relationship is better 
approximating the data. Estimates suggest that for countries with a GDP per capita lower than 3250 US$ 
economic growth is associated with lower endowments of social capital. Beyond that threshold, the relationship 
turns positive. This result is reassuring: even if the early stages of economic development are associated with 
lower levels of social capital, the development process itself will solve the problem. All that we need is time and 
fostering economic growth. Hence, will raising GDP (or social capital) increase social capital (or GDP)? 
Unfortunately, the answer is negative. 
 
Considering time trends computed over periods longer than 10 years for both developed and developing 
countries, the variation of social capital is negatively associated with economic growth. This result holds for three 
proxies of social capital (group membership, trust in others and an index of civic cooperation) and various time 
spans. 
 
Various hypotheses can be formulated to explain the contrast between the correlation of stocks and variations 
of social capital with economic growth. A reasonable one refers to the role of income inequality. In this paper I 
provided some evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the negative relationship among trends is driven by 
economic inequality. In countries with stronger increases in inequality, trends of social capital are negatively 
correlated with economic growth. On the contrary, for countries where economic growth is accompanied by 
negative or modest increases in inequality the same relationship turns non-significant. 
Summarizing, these figures suggest that rich countries should not expect any substantial increase in well-being 
from economic growth and should rather re-orient their development policies to support other aspects, such as 
social capital, to promote durable well-being. For what concern poorer countries, the conclusions are less 
stringent: these countries can reason- ably have higher expectations in terms of well-being improvements from 
economic growth. However, also in this case the effects on well-being can be durable if social capital is not 
eroded. 
 
Nonetheless, we shall be cautious in drawing any strong conclusion from this evidence. Issues of endogeneity 
and the limitations imposed by data-availability constrain the scope of this work. However, it seems safe to say 
that results stating a positive correlation between stocks of social capital and economic growth cannot be directly 
extended to the time-series relationship. Thus, the hypothesis that economic growth is the outcome of a NEG-like 
process cannot be discarded. 
 
This conclusion probably raises more questions than the ones it answers: more research on the nature and 
direction of the relationship between economic growth and social capital is needed. Hopefully, the availability of 
new data will allow to address these issues in more detail in coming years. 
About the author 
Francesco Sarracino is an economist working for the national institute of statistics of Luxembourg. His work focuses on 
social capital, economic growth, and subjective well-being.  
  
144   Francesco Sarracino /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  72 ( 2013 )  120 – 148 
References 
Allison, A.D. (2001). Missing data. SAGE University Paper, 136.  
Argyle, M. (1988). Social cognition and social interaction. The Psychologist, 1, 177, 183. 
Argyle, M., & Furnham, A. (1982). The ecology of relationships: Choice of situation as a function of relationship. British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 21, 259 – 262.  
Argyle, M., & Martin, M. (1991). The psychological causes of happiness. In: Strack, F. (ed.), Subjective well-being: An 
interdisciplinary perspective (pp. 77–100). New York: Plenum Press.  
Arrow, K. (1972). Gifts and exchanges. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 343 – 362.  
Badura, B. (1984). Life-style and health: Some remarks in different viewpoints. Social science and medicine, 19,341 – 347. 
Barro, R (1991). Economic growth in a cross-section of countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVI, 407 – 444.  
Bartolini, S., & Bonatti, L. (2002a). Environmental and social degradation as the engine of economic growth. Ecological 
Economics, 41, 1-16. 
Bartolini, S., & Bonatti, L. (2003). Endogenous growth and negative externalities. Journal of economics, 79(2), 123-144.  
Bartolini, S., & Bonatti, L (2008). Endogenous growth, decline in social capital and expansion of market activities. Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization, 67(3), 917 – 926.  
Bartolini, S., & Sarracino, S. (2011). Happy for how long? How social capital and GDP relate to happiness over time. 
Working Paper No 2011-60, Luxembourg: CEPS/INSTEAD. 
Bartolini, S., Bilancini, E., & Sarracino, F. (2010). Predicting the trend of well-being in Germany: How much do 
comparisons, adaptation, and sociability matter? CEPS/Instead Working Papers, 2010-07.  
Bartolini, S., Bilancini, E., & Pugno, M. (2011). Did the decline in social connections depress Americans’ happiness? Social 
Indicators Research. DOI 10.1007/s11205-011-9971-x  
Bartolini, S., Bilancini, E., & Sarracino, F. (2012a). Predicting the trend of well-being in Germany: How much do 
comparisons, adaptation, and sociability matter? Social Indicators Research. DOI: 10.1007/s11205-012-0142-5 
Bartolini, S., Mikucka, M., & Sarracino, F. (2012b). Money, trust, and happiness in Transition countries: evidence from time 
series. Working Paper No 2012-04. Luxembourg:  CEPS/INSTEAD.  
Becchetti, L., Pelloni, A., & Rossetti, F. (2008). Relational goods, sociability, and happiness. Kyklos, 61(3), 343 – 363. 
Becchetti, L., Trovato, G., & Bedoya, D. (2011). Income, relational goods, and happiness. Applied Economics, 43(3), 273–
290, 2011.  
Berkman, L/F., & Syme, S.L. (1979). Social networks, host resistance, and mortality: A nine-year follow-up study of 
Alameda country residents. American Journal of Epidemiology, 109, 186 – 204. 
Beugelsdijk, S., & van Schaik, T. (2005). Social capital and growth in European regions: An empirical test. European Journal 
of Political Economy, 21, 301 – 324. 
Beugelsdijk, S., de Groot, H., & van Schaik, A. (2004). Trust and economic growth: A robustness analysis. Oxford Economic 
Papers, 56, 118 – 134. 
Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In: Richardson J.G. (Ed.), Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of 
education (pp. 241-258). New York: Greenwood Press. 
Bruni, L., & Stanca, L. (2008). Watching alone: Relational goods, television, and happiness. Journal of Economic Behaviour 
and Organization, 65(3), 506 – 528.  
Campbell, A., Converse, P.E., & Rodgers, W.L. (1976). The quality of American life. New York: Sage  
Coleman, J.S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Costa, D.L., & Kahn, M.E. (2003).Understanding the decline in social capital, 1952-1998. Kyklos, 56, 17–46. 
della Giusta, M., (2010). Social capital and economic development. Economics and Management Discussion Papers, emdp 
2010-01, 2010. Reading University: Henley Business School. 
Easterlin, R.A. (1974). Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical evidence. In: David, P.A., & Melvin, 
W.E (Eds.), Nations and households in economic growth (pp. 98 – 125). Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 
Easterlin, R.A. (2009). Lost in transition: Life satisfaction on the road to capitalism. Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organization, 71(2), 130–145. 
Easterlin, R.A., Angelescu, L., McVey, M., Switek, M., Sawangfa, O., & Smith Zweig, J. (2010). The happiness-income 
paradox revisited. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(52), 22463–22468.  
Helliwell, J. (1996). Economic growth and social capital in Asia. NBER Working Paper, no. 5470.  
Helliwell, J., & Putnam, R. (1995). Economic growth and social capital in Italy. Eastern Economic Journal, XXI, 295 – 307. 
Helliwell, J. (2006). Well-being, social capital, and public policy: What’s new? The Economic Journal, 116(5), 34 – 45. 
Helliwell, J. (2007). Well-being and social capital: Does suicide pose a puzzle? Social Indicators Research, 81(3), 455 – 496. 
Helliwell, J., & Putnam, R (2004). The social context of well-being. Philosophical Transactions: Royal Society of 
London, 359(1449), 1435 – 1446.  
145 Francesco Sarracino /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  72 ( 2013 )  120 – 148 
 
Hirsch, F., (1976). Social limits to growth. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Jemmott, J.B., & Locke, S.E. (1984). Psychosocial factors, immunology mediation, and human susceptibility to infectious 
diseases: How much do we know? Psychological Bulletin, 95, 78– 108. 
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country investigation. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 112, 1251-1288. 
Kraut, R.E., & Johnson, R.E (1979). Social and emotional messages of smiling: An ethological approach. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1539 – 1553. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. (1999). Trust in large organizations. In: Dasgupta, P., & 
Seregaldin, I (Eds.), Social capital - a multifaceted perspective (pp. 310 – 324). Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Little, R.J.A., & Rubin, R.D. (2002). Statistical analysis with missing data. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Narayan, D., & Pritchett, L. (1997). Cents and sociability: Household income and social capital in rural Tanzania. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper. Washington D.C.: World Bank  
OECD (2001). The evidence on social capital. In The well-being of nations: The role of human and social capital (pp. 39 – 
63). Paris: OECD. 
Olson, M. (192). The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Paxton, P (1999). Is social capital declining in the United States? A multiple indicator assessment. American Journal of 
Sociology, 105(1), 88 – 127. 
Polanyi, K. (1986). The great transformation. Boston: Beacon. 
Putnam, R.D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Roth, F., (2009). Does too much trust hamper economic growth? Kyklos, 62(1), 103–128. 
Sacks, D.W., Stevenson, B., & Wolfers, J. (2010). Subjective well-being, income, economic development, and growth. NBER 
Working Paper Series, no. 16441.  
Sarracino, F. (2011). Money, sociability, and happiness: Are developed countries doomed to social erosion and unhappiness? 
Social Indicators Research, 109, 135-188. 
Sarracino, F. (2012). Determinants of subjective well-being in high and low-income countries: Do happiness equations differ 
across countries? Journal of Socio-Economics. DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2012.11.006.  
Saunders, J. A., Morrow-Howell N., Spitznagel, E., Dore, P., Proctor, E.K., & Pescarino, R. (2006). Imputing missing data: A 
comparison of methods for social work researchers. Social work research, 30(1), 19 – 31. 
Schafer, J.L. (1997). Analysis of incomplete multivariate data. London: Chapman and Hall. 
Schafer, J.L., & Graham, J.W. (2002). Missing data: Our view of the state of the art. Psychological methods, 7, 147 – 177.  
Solt, F., (2010). Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database. Social Science Quarterly, 90(2), 231 – 242. 
Stevenson, B., & Wolfers, J. (2008). Economic growth and subjective well-being: Reassessing the Easterlin paradox. IZA 
Discussion Paper, no. 3654. Bonn: IZA.  
Van Schaik, T. (2002). Social capital in the European Values Study surveys. Country paper prepared for the OECD-ONS 
International Conference on Social Capital Measurement. London, September, 25 – 27, 2002.  
Veroff, J. Douvan, E., & Kulka, R.A. (1981). The inner American. New York: Basic Books. 
Whiteley, P. J. (2000). Economic growth and social capital. Political Studies, 48, 443 – 466. 
Zak, P. J., & Knack, S. (2001). Trust and growth. The Economic Journal, 111, 295 – 321. 
 
 
  
146   Francesco Sarracino /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  72 ( 2013 )  120 – 148 
Appendix A. Descriptive statistics for countries with at least 2 years of observations 
Table A.1. Patterns of missingness in the pooled data set 
 
variable mean sd min max obs missing 
group membership 0.590 0.492 0 1 245402 0.115 
trust in others 0.324 0.468 0 1 265225 0.0432 
civic cooperation 0.0811 0.937 -4.900 0.768 232249 0.162 
ln of GDP per capita 8.852 1.374 5.679 10.93 269299 0.0285 
Gini index 35.92 10.30 20.13 65.47 239624 0.136 
 
Table A.2. Patterns of missingness across waves. 
 
variable wave 1 wave 2 wave 3 wave 4 wave 5 wave 6 total 
membership in at least 1 group or association 0 0.157 0.0395 0.265 0.0518 0.0405 245402 
trust in others 0.0613 0.0688 0.0317 0.0401 0.0325 0.0334 265225 
civic cooperation 0.0576 0.0970 0.201 0.263 0.177 0.0346 232249 
ln of GDP per capita 0.0116 0.00659 0.0478 0.0466 0.0222 0.0162 269299 
Gini index 0.0634 0.0303 0 0.0424 0.370 0.359 239624 
 
Appendix B. Descriptive statistics for countries with at least 15 years of observations 
Table B.1. Patterns of missingness in the pooled data set. 
 
variable mean sd min max obs missing 
group membership 0.596 0.491 0 1 189226 0.0602 
trust in others 0.352 0.477 0 1 192353 0.0447 
civic cooperation 0.0626 0.943 -4.900 0.768 172626 0.143 
ln of GDP per capita 9.292 1.115 5.763 10.65 199231 0.0105 
Gini index 34.36 10.50 20.13 65.47 174615 0.133 
 
Table B.2.Patterns of missingness across waves 
 
variable wave 1 wave 2 wave 3 wave 4 wave 5 wave 6 total 
group membership 0 0.139 0.0400 0.0812 0.00205 0.0467 189226 
trust in others 0.0613 0.0689 0.0363 0.0308 0.0331 0.0316 192353 
civic cooperation 0.0576 0.0988 0.189 0.345 0.0624 0.0326 172626 
ln of GDP per capita 0.0116 0.00673 0 0.0239 0 0.0187 199231 
Gini index 0.0634 0.0310 0 0.0709 0.298 0.415 174615 
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Appendix C. Correlations from pooled data 
Table C.1 Cross-section correlations among SC proxies and log of GDP per capita. 
 
 group membership group membership trust in others trust in others civic cooperation civic 
cooperation 
 
log of GDP 
0.338 
(1.96) 
−5.466 
(−2.89) 
0.557 
(4.11) 
−5.888 
(−4.62) 
0.322 
(2.35) 
−2.908 
(−1.69) 
log of GDP (squared)  5.820 6.462  3.239 
  (3.11) (5.09)  (1.92) 
Constant −8.41e − 10 −1.00e − 09 9.89e − 10 8.07e − 10 −2.12e − 09 −2.21e − 09 
 (−0.00) (−0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (−0.00) (−0.00) 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.276 0.296 0.526 0.085 0.128 
t statistics in parentheses 
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001 
Standardized coefficients. 
Appendix D. List of groups and associations mentioned in the WVS/EVS questionnaire 
Respondents were asked to mention whether they belonged or were performing unpaid voluntary work for any 
of the following list of associations: 
• social welfare service for elderly; 
•  religious organization; 
• education, arts, music or cultural activities; 
• labour unions; 
• political parties; 
• local political actions; 
• human rights; 
• conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights; 
• conservation, the environment, ecology; 
• animal rights; 
• professional associations; 
• youth work; 
• sports or recreation; 
• women’s group; 
• peace movement; 
• organization concerned with health; 
• consumer groups; 
• other groups. 
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Appendix E. Factor analysis for the index of civic cooperation 
In the pooled sample, factor loadings range from .70 to .78 thus suggesting that the four variables contribute 
equally to the definition of civic cooperation. The picture does not change much when observing results wave by 
wave. In this case, factor loadings stay approximately constant across waves. 
 
The slight variability among factor loadings both in the pooled sample and within waves support the decision 
to build an aggregated index of civic cooperation resulting from the standardized weighted average of the four 
items. 
 
Table E.1 Factor loading and unique variances for the pooled sample 
 
 Factor 1 Psi 
justifiable: claiming government benefits .709342 .4968339 
justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport .7651148 .4145993 
justifiable: cheating on taxes .7831872 .3866178 
justifiable: someone accepting a bribe .7194097 .4824497 
 
 
